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In his paper Karl-Dieter Opp heroically sets out to defend both the adequacy  and sociological 
fruitfulness of the covering law account of explanation (the HO scheme). The attempt is bold, as he 
is not only  defending the HO scheme as a theory  of explanation but also as a scheme for finding and 
establishing causal relationships. In this reply I will argue that the defense is not successful; quite 
the contrary, it  clearly  demonstrates why mechanism-based reasoning is important in the social 
sciences. I also argue that this change in metatheoretical perspective has implications for thinking 
about the role of rational choice theory  in sociology, which should not be seen as a foundational 
theory but rather as a version of common sense psychology that can be used for modeling purposes.
What is the HO scheme?
Let us first take a look at Opp’s position. What he takes and defends as the HO scheme is actually a 
combination of two separate theories. First, there is the theory of explanation attributed to Hempel 
and Oppenheim (Hempel 1965: 245-290). Second, there is a theory  of causation, traditionally called 
the humean regularity theory  of causation. While it is obvious from his text that Opp  supports the 
HO theory  of explanation1, my claim about the assumed theory of causation requires some 
justification. My argument is the following: The HO theory, in itself, says notthing about causation, 
and in the debates about scientific explanation, the absence of causal considerations have been 
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1 Opp claims that the HO scheme ”is not in any sense a theory,  as Hedström and Ylikoski (2010: 55) and others assert.” 
This is nonsense. The HO theory is a philosophical theory about the nature of explanation and is discussed in the 
relevant literature as one.
identified as one of the key reasons for its failure.2 However, Opp  treats the HO theory as a scheme 
for evaluating and justifying causal claims. Thus there have to be some additional assumptions 
about causation. The text contains evidence of him supporting some sort of regularity  view of 
causation. First, he defines laws as either deterministic or statistical general statements about the 
regular succession of events. Second, he opposes competing theories of causation, such as 
counterfactual and generative theories. Third, he denies that advocates of mechanisms have shown 
that there is a ”difference between statements like ’X brings about Y’ and ’X is regularly  related to 
Y.’ (Opp, xx)”. Finally, he says that the statement "manipulating smoking changes cancer" is 
equivalent to "if smoking increases (or decreases), then cancer increases (or decreases)” (Opp, xx), 
thus reducing the manipulation theory of causation to the regularity view. 
Neither the covering law theory of explanation nor the regularity theory  of causation have fared 
well in philosophy of science debates over the last 50 years. While it would be false to say that a 
consensus exists on the nature of causation or explanation among philosophers of science, many 
think that neither of the theories Opp advocates are among the plausible candidates in their 
respective debates (Salmon 1989, 1998; Humphreys 1989; Ruben 1990; Woodward 2003; Craver 
2007). This is reflected in the debates about mechanism-based explanation. For example, the 
criticism of the HO theory  presented in Hedström & Ylikoski 2010 is basically a brief and selective 
summary  of the standard arguments presented in the philosophical discussion. It  is regrettable that 
Opp did not find the summaries convincing, and he should have looked at  the more extended 
arguments found in the references. Given that these arguments have become philosophical 
commonplaces, I find it puzzling that Opp chooses to ignore them completely. He seems to assume 
that the HO theory is still the default position in the debate, as it was some 40 years ago. Thus he 
assumes that if he manages to criticize the mechanistic account sufficiently, his Hempel-inspired 
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2  This is compatible with the fact that Hempel himself thought that the model also applies to the case of causal 
explanation (Hempel 1965). Such explanations involve causal laws, but they are not explanatory because they involve 
causes, but rather because they satisfy the requirements of the HO scheme. Later philosophers have argued that 
causation plays a more fundamental role in explanation (Salmon 1989, 1998; Humphreys 1989;  Woodward 2003). 
account will be the one that benefits. My reading of the argumentative situation is quite different. 
The current debate in philosophy of science is not about whether we should replace Hempel’s 
account, but what should be the replacement. The burden of proof lies on any supporter of the 
covering law theory wishes to be taken seriously: one must show that the accumulated evidence 
against the theory does not pose a serious challenge for the theory. 
Quite clearly Opp does not  do this. Our claim in Hedström & Ylikoski 2010 was that the HO theory 
fails as a theory of explanation. I have found nothing in Opp’s paper that would challenge this 
claim. Consider his answer to the problem of irrelevant information, a well-known problem for the 
covering law theory. From early on, critics of Hempel’s account have pointed out that explanations 
can be constructed that fulfill all the requirements of the HO scheme but which do not seem to be 
explanatory. For example, explaining John’s failure to get pregnant by  citing his regular eating of 
contraceptive pills would be – counterintuitively – a valid explanation according to the HO scheme. 
For philosophers of science, counterexamples like this signify something being wrong with the HO 
theory. They  agree with Opp  that  scientists rarely  provide silly  explanations like these. However, 
they  sharply disagree with him about the significance of this observation. Opp thinks that 
everything is in order, because there is an additional criterion to be used: ”the laws are to be applied 
that are used in the social sciences” (Opp, xx). I fail to see how this solves the problems with the 
HO-theory. The challenge for a theory  of explanation is to identify the features of explanations that 
make them explanatory, and Opp’s suggested criterion does nothing like that. Thus it is still 
legitimate to think that the easy way in which counterexamples can be generated for the HO theory 
suggests that it  has missed something essential about explanation. This is precisely what we claim 
in Hedström & Ylikoski 2010.
The problem of irrelevant information is not the only serious problem the HO theory faces. The 
philosophical literature is full of similar challenges. Here are some examples. First are the problems 
justifying the two central assumptions of the theory – that explanations are deductive arguments and 
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that explanations must refer to laws. Neither seems to be necessary for simple cases of causal 
explanation (Salmon 1989; Ruben 1990, Ylikoski 2005). Second, while the theory  is presented as a 
general theory of explanation, it has had serious problems with explaining both probabilistic events 
and laws (Salmon 1989). The problem with explaining laws was recognized by  Hempel (1965) 
himself, and in the explanation of probabilistic events, ideas like the model of inductive-statistical 
explanation seem to create more problems than solve them. (For example, there is no generally 
accepted version of inductive logic.) Third, the theory  does not seem the get the direction of 
explanation right: after all; it  sounds implausible to explain Karl-Dieter’s length by appealing to the 
length of his shadow – the explanation should go other way around – but this it  what the theory 
allows. Thus the HO theory denies the plausible assumption that explanation is an asymmetric 
relation (Salmon 1989). Fourth, it is widely  recognized that the HO theory is unable to make a 
sensible distinction between explanation and prediction (Salmon 1989). For Hempel, explaining a 
thing is to make it expected, but this perspective has trouble with cases where reliable diagnostic 
criteria allow reliable prediction but we do not understand why, and also with cases where we can 
explain (after the fact) what happened but are not able to predict the outcome beforehand. Both 
kinds of cases are common in the sciences, which suggests that  Hempel’s idea about the similarity 
between explanation and prediction is mistaken. Fifth, the theory  faces a thorny problem of 
epistemic access: given that we are often ignorant of the relevant laws and deductive arguments, 
how do we manage to make judgements about explanatory relations? In the HO theory it is a 
mystery  how ordinary explanations (even in science) provide understanding, as the crucial elements 
of the explanation are epistemically inaccessible to ordinary users of such explanations (Woodward 
2003: 23-24). Sixth, the notion of ”law” still remains a mere placeholder for a better-defined 
concept, despite the fact that most of the heavy  lifting in the theory  is done by it (Woodward 2003). 
Finally, it seems that covering laws that could be used in explanations are quite rare in the non-
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physical sciences, and that those appearing like they could are not truly explanatory, but rather 
things to be explained (Cummins 2000). 
These are all well-known problems with the HO theory, and they do not go away  simply by 
ignoring them. Thus it is fair to say that Opp fails in his defense of the HO theory. Is he more 
successful in his criticism of the mechanism-based view of explanation?
Deduction and generalizations in explanation
Opp’s implicit assumption seems to be that the main point of the mechanism-based account of 
explanation is to deny that  explanations are deductive arguments and that generalizations have a 
role in the justification of causal claims. This is a misunderstanding: the mechanisms-based 
approach is not based on a negation of covering law theory, but rather on a set of positive ideas 
about explanation. I will not repeat here what has been clearly said elsewhere (Craver 2007, 
Hedström & Ylikoski 2010, Ylikoski 2011), but I do want to show how Opp has misunderstood the 
arguments about the role of deduction and generalizations.
Let us begin with the role of deduction in explanation. The central claim of the mechanism 
advocates is not that explanations cannot be reconstructed as deductive arguments. Instead, they 
argue that explanations are not explanations because they are deductive arguments. Opp seems to 
have missed the difference between these two claims. For example, Ylikoski (2005, 2009) argues 
that deductive reconstruction of explanations is advisable, but that these explanations are not 
explanatory  because they are deductive. People had been giving explanations long before the 
invention of formal logic; there are plenty  of nonpropositional explanations (for example, using 
diagrams and pictorial representations); and most propositional explanations do not have a 
deductive structure (although they  might have some deductive passages). So as a descriptive claim, 
the thesis that all explanations are deductive arguments is not very plausible. However, deductivism 
can be taken as a practical suggestion for improving explanatory practice. Explanations are 
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therefore not deductive arguments, but they can be reconstructed as such (Ylikoski 2005). The idea 
is that an (even partial) attempt at  deductive reconstruction can improve explanatory practice as it 
forces us to be explicit both about background assumptions and about the intended explanandum. 
This is probably the main reason some people are still intuitively  attracted to the deductive ideal. 
Naturally, deductive reconstruction is not a foolproof procedure (Ylikoski 2009). For example, if 
the explanation is based on circular reasoning it will satisfy the requirement of a deductive relation 
trivially. Similarly, deductive reconstruction does not help if the explanatory theory  is fudged with 
filler terms and other placeholders that hide rather than open the crucial black boxes. To deal with 
these, one needs more substantial ideas about explanation. This has, in fact, been one of the main 
motivations for developing mechanism-based accounts of explanation.   
Similarly, Opp’s multiple arguments in defense of causal generalizations completely  miss their 
target. The defenders of mechanisms do not argue for the foolish position that general causal claims 
are impossible or that they are irrelevant to the justification of causal claims. To the contrary, the 
mechanism-based account presupposes causal generalizations. However, Hedström & Ylikoski 
2010 (see also Ylikoski 2011) argue that these are not universal generalizations about the constant 
conjunctions of events assumed by  Opp, but  more like domain-restricted invariances that allow for 
contrafactual inferences about the effects of potential interventions described by James Woodward’s 
theory (Woodward 2003: 239-314). 
This is important because the traditional view – supported by Opp  and Hempel – has failed to 
provide a satisfactory  account of the nature of laws and their role in explanation. While Opp 
attempts to reduce invariances to laws, they do not satisfy the criteria he himself sets for laws. 
Invariances usually  hold only for a limited range of possible interventions (and changes in 
background factors); they can refer to particular objects, places and times, and they might have 
exceptions. In short, they might hold only in a certain domain and collapse outside of it. This is 
good news for the social sciences (and other sciences outside of fundamental physics): the 
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generalizations satisfying the traditional criteria of lawhood are quite rare, and mostly  not very 
useful from the point of view of explanation. However, there is one sense in which the idea of 
invariance is more demanding; i.e. invariance is a modal notion, and it  makes a claim that  the 
invariant relationship between cause and effect variables will hold under a set of possible 
interventions. The idea is that this captures what is essential from the point of view of explanation, 
whereas most of the traditional attributes are merely superficial. Of course, Opp is free to call these 
generalizations ”laws,” but then he must recognize that they  are quite different from the 
generalization his own account is based on.
In the context of the justification of causal claims, Opp completely  misses the main motivation for 
talking about mechanisms in this context. The advocates of mechanism have not denied that  all 
causal claims are generalizable (in some form). Nor have they  denied that we can appeal to 
generalizations when we are justifying causal claims. The advocates of mechanisms have typically 
argued that knowledge about mechanisms plays an important role in justifying claims that  certain 
generalizations are indeed causal generalizations. So the issue is not whether generalizations are 
involved in the justification of causal claims, but rather how do we know that the generalizations 
used are truly causal. A singular causal claim can only be justified by a generalization if that 
generalization is itself causal. The constant conjunction view of causation advocated by Opp  is 
notorius for its inability  to distinguish real causal relations from mere correlations, and thus is not a 
very good candidate solution to this problem. This failure is the main reason why people have 
began to discuss things like mechanisms and causal manipulation.  
I conclude that  little that is useful emerges from Opp’s criticisms of the mechanism-based theory of 
explanation. Whatever problems mechanism-based thinking in analytical sociology have, Opp does 
not identify them. This is probably  because he assumes that the mechanistic approach amounts to a 
denial of the HO theory. As I have suggested above, this is not the main point. The goal is to replace 
the HO theory, not just deny it. There is no reason to repeat what has been said elsewhere 
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(Hedström 2005; Hedström & Ylikoski 2010, 2011; Ylikoski 2011, 2012), so I will finish this reply 
by presenting some observations about the manner in which the mechanism-based approach can 
help in rethinking rational choice theory in sociology.
Rational choice theory as a general theory of action?
How explanations are conceived is not just an esoteric metatheoretical question, it has real 
implications for thinking about sociological theory. A good example of this is Opp’s defense of 
rational choice theory as a foundation of sociological theory. If the covering law theory is 
abandoned and replaced with a more plausible mechanism-based account, much of Opp’s 
theoretical vision for sociology will lose most of its appeal. I cannot provide a full account of 
rational choice theory  in sociology, but I hope the following observations will help in seeing how 
metatheoretical ideas about explanation have real implications for sociological theory.
In the covering law account all the premises of the deductive argument have the same status, so it 
does not provide the resources to distinguish those assumptions whose falsity is irrelevant to a given 
explanation from those whose falsity  matters. This easily  leads to the kind of instrumentalism that 
many rational choice theorists represent: it does not matter if the explanation contains false 
assumptions – or that the highly  stylized explanandum has no counterpart in empirical reality – as 
long as the explanation has a deductive structure where the favorite premises of the theorist play  a 
central role. And if many ‘elegant’ explanations can be constructed where the same premises figure, 
the theorist calls that set of premises a ‘powerful’ and ‘unifying’ theory.3 A good example of this is 
the way Opp represents his ‘wide rational choice theory.’ 
This approach to explanation seems arbitrary and it does not allow for a sensible way  of dealing 
with unrealistic assumptions. For realists about explanation, the key issue is whether explanation 
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3 It is worth noting that while covering law theorists like Opp are quite keen on making judgments about ”explanatory 
power”, but they never provide systematic account of what kind of quality it is.  In contrast to the competing account 
(Ylikoski & Kuorikoski 2010), the HO theory does not seem to have the resources to articulate the different dimensions 
of explanatory goodness and to show why they are epistemically valuable.
gets the crucial causal dependencies right. It  is not enough that the model “saves the phenomena,” it 
should represent the essential features of the actual causal process responsible for the observed 
phenomenon (Hedström & Ylikoski 2010, 2011). For this reason the “as if”-attitude displayed so 
often by rational choice theorists is not acceptable. Ultimately the theoretical assumptions should be 
both empirically valid and compatible with the results of other disciplines. 
This realist attitude has implications for rational choice theory in sociology. Contrary to what Opp 
claims, rational choice theory has not been rejected by analytical sociologists (Hedström & Ylikoski 
2010) simply because it contains ”false assumptions.” Analytical sociologists have not rejected 
rational choice theory – in fact, quite many continue to employ it (see Demeulenaere 2011) – but 
what has been suggested is the reinterpretation of its place in sociological theory. The advantage of 
the assumptions of rational choice theory is that they  can be used for modeling social processes, and 
this has generated a lot of interesting research in the social sciences. However, these benefits of 
rational choice theory can be enjoyed without assuming that it has a foundational role in the social 
sciences or that rational choice theory  is the only  legitimate framework for modeling social 
phenomena. 
As an explanatory scheme, rational choice theory  (in its many variations) is just one variant of 
common sense psychology  that employs intentional concepts (Hedström & Ylikoski 2011). When 
rational choice theory actually explains individual behavior, it does it  by identifying the beliefs and 
desires that actually  behind a person’s behavior. The talk about preferences is just a convenient way 
to abstract away from the messy psychological processes related to desires and other behavioral 
dispositions (Freese 2009: 98-99). While the abstract scheme of beliefs and preferences is useful for 
some purposes, there is no reason to arbitrarily restrict the available representations of intentional 
action to those that have their origin in normative decision theory.
The conceptual scheme of beliefs and preferences is quite flexible, but this vocabulary cannot 
accommodate all psychological phenomena that might be of sociological interest. All kinds of 
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psychological factors such as emotions, habits, and expressive motives might be important in 
explaining social processes, and it  would seem foolish to exclude such factors from consideration 
only because they cannot be plausibly expressed in rational choice vocabulary. Similarly, we should 
be open to findings from the cognitive sciences. Things like stereotype threat (Schmader, Johns & 
Forbes 2008) or automatic processes (Wilson 2002) might have great sociological significance in 
particular applications. Naturally, all of the details of our cognition are not relevant from the point 
of view of understanding social mechanisms – quite often something like the simple desire-belief-
opportunity scheme is sufficient for sociological purposes (Hedström 2005) – but sometimes they 
are. Too strong an adherence to a particular version of common sense psychology might blinker 
sociological research. 
The argument here is not that rational choice theory is the wrong foundational theory for sociology. 
The point I am trying to make is that sociology does not  need a foundational theory of action. It 
makes no sense to assume that there should be some unique or privileged version of intentional 
psychology – the sociological theory of action – that  would serve all sociological purposes. So what 
I deny, is the explanatory privilege of rational choice theory. Rationality is not an excuse for 
misrepresenting relevant causal facts. Nor it  is a good reason to block the development of 
sociological theorizing. If the idea of a general sociological theory  of action make sociologists 
neglect the findings of the sciences of cognition, this is not only unappealing but also positively 
harmful.
From this perspective, most of the unification of social scientific knowledge produced by rational 
choice theory is more or less illusory. Many kinds of models can be built using the wide rational 
choice theory framework, and most analytical narratives provided by social scientists can be 
translated into the abstract belief-preference language of rational choice theory. This does not imply 
that rational choice theory is a powerful explanatory theory. It merely shows that rational choice 
theory  uses a flexible vocabulary. Thus, Opp (2011: 213) cannot merely state that ”rational choice 
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theory  only  claims that human behavior is governed by costs and benefits; there need not be 
calculation”. He should also give us an account of how the costs and benefits govern human 
behavior in the different applications of the theory. Without this the theory  provides no substantial 
unification in terms of theory  of action, only a highly  abstract  verbal way to describe the choices the 
agents face. This is one of the drawbacks of the HO theory: it makes it  too easy to give explanations 
based on black boxes as it does not require an articulation of underlying mechanisms. 
Contrary  to what Opp suggests, rational choice theory is not best  conceived as a collection of 
empirical generalizations that serve as the theoretical foundation of social scientific theories. It is 
hard to see the key assumptions of wide rational choice theory  as substantial empirical claims. The 
principle ”preferences are determinants of action” (Opp, xx), for example, sound more like a 
definition than a substantial causal claim. Similarly  ”social action is determined by what the actors 
think is best for them” (Opp, xx) is more like a principle for reconstructing an actor’s beliefs and 
preferences rather than an empirical finding in social psychology. The wide rational choice theory 
seems to amount to a conceptually thin – but flexible – scheme for providing intentional 
explanations. I see no reason to give it any kind of theoretical privilege. Thus when sociologists use 
wide rational choice theory in their analytical narratives, it is just one variant of common sense 
psychology that can often be replaced without losing anything empirically important. 
There is an alternative way to conceive of rational choice theory. As Lovett (2006) argues, many 
economists and political scientists do not treat it as a unified, monolithic, or universal theory of 
social phenomena. Rather than a foundational theory of action, they  take it as a set of conceptual 
tools for constructing models. In this view rational choice theory does not make substantial 
assumptions about psychological processes that generate human behavior, it only assumes that an 
agent’s preferences can be (approximately) presented utility by functions. As Lovett say: 
Since utility  functions are simply defined merely as those functions we expect social actors to 
act as if they  are attempting to maximize, an intentional explanation of social phenomena 
11
grounded on utility maximization would indeed be (almost) perfectly  circular. But this is not 
the role utility functions play in well-constructed game-theoretic rational choice models. They 
merely summarize in a concise mathematical expression our expectations regarding their 
behavior insofar as it is relevant for the social phenomenon we are interested in 
understanding. (Lovett 2006: 264) 
The point Lovett makes here is that when used in this way, rational choice theory is not doing any 
real explanatory  work, it only provides a modeling framework. The purpose of these models is to 
determine how stable patterns of social behavior might arise given some configuration of structural 
constraints, not to explain individual behavior.
By themselves, these models are only conceptual explorations of how mechanisms built  upon 
certain assumptions would behave if certain assumptions hold. If the models are to be used to 
explain real empirical observation – much of the formal work in game theory does not address any 
recognizable empirical facts – some extra work is needed. For the results of the model to be 
extrapolated to the real world, they must be robust (Lehtinen & Kuorikoski 2007, Kuorikoski, 
Lehtinen & Marchionni 2010). Thus models that are highly sensitive to detailed modeling 
assumptions are not good candidates for extrapolation: the model has to identify  the dependencies 
that can be expected to hold in more complicated situations as well. If the explanatory dependence 
is highly dependent on some unrealistic assumptions of the model, the model will not  permit an 
extrapolation to possible causal mechanisms that are relevant in the real world. Tractability should 
not trump causal realism.
As it turns out, many rational choice models do not have the right kind of robustness, and these 
models cannot be taken seriously  as models of real world phenomena. They  might have some 
interesting formal properties, and they  might be useful for some heuristic purposes, but they are not 
the kinds of explanatory  accounts that empirically oriented social scientists are looking for.  Luckily 
for rational choice theory, all rational choice models do not fail the robustness test. However, 
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usually  the successful models only give rise to qualitative claims about real world phenomena. 
What is interesting about this exportable content of formal models is that often it can be expressed 
without commitment to the restrictive assumptions of rational choice theory. Quite often a very 
simple DBO scheme (Hedström 2005) is sufficient for this purpose. Thus when rational choice 
formalism is finally given an interpretation in terms of common sense psychology, the vocabulary 
of rational choice theory has no special privilege and the restrictive rational choice theory 
assumptions play no real explanatory role.
Thus it is possible to accept, and endorse, without a commitment  to Opp’s vision of foundational 
rational choice theory, those rational choice models whose robust  results do not depend on 
unrealistic rational choice assumptions. This is good news. Given the empirical challenges to the 
assumptions of the theory, sociological rational choice theorists have been forced into defensive 
moves. First, they  have moved further and further away from the homo economicus core of rational 
choice theory by broadening the content  of the theory  (Kronenberg & Kalter 2012). The problem 
here is that as the core theory becomes less rigorous, it also provides less theory-guidance and 
constraints. Finding a rational choice model that fits a particular phenomenon becomes rather easy, 
as there are no real constraints on preferences and beliefs that can be attributed to the individuals in 
question. In addition, a real danger exist of the analytical strengths of the standard rational choice 
theory  model being lost. A second set of defensive moves concerns metatheory, meaning that 
rational choice theories feel tempted to adopt an instrumentalist attitude that would allow them to 
claim that it does not really  matter whether the explanatory assumptions are true, that the precision 
of the models is more important than their empirical adequacy, and that concerns about derivational 
unification override those of getting the crucial causal details right. 
These unproductive defensive moves are not necessary. We only  need to update our metatheory 
about explanation and give up the idea about the foundational role of rational choice theory. In the 
more flexible realist account, social scientists can take an instrumentalist attitude towards rational 
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choice theory rather than towards the explanatory  goals of science. In this view, rational choice 
theory  is treated as one possible scheme for building models about social processes. Social 
scientists are therefore free to endorse and accept those models that do not fail the robustness test. 
However, they are also free to explore alternative modeling frameworks – such as rapidly 
developing agent-based simulation (Macy & Flache 2009) – under the same rules. This view 
recognizes that social scientists are bound to use some version of common sense psychology in their 
theorizing, but no version of it is given a privileged position, and the pursuit of formal unification 
does not restrict the way in which insights from cognitive and psychological theories can be 
incorporated into the accounts of human action. 
Unification and middle-range theories
The unification of knowledge should be about  developing a comprehensive and consistent 
understanding of the causal structure of the world. Given the world’s complexity, the idea of a 
unified foundational theory should be treated with great  suspicion. It is better to focus on theories of 
a more limited scope that are compatible with knowledge that is produced by other fields. This is 
the vision of middle-range theorizing that analytical sociologists advocate (Hedström & Ylikoski 
2010). Contrary to what Opp (xx) claims, these sociologists do are not subscribe to everything ever 
called middle-range theory, nor do they assume that these theories are limited to specific subject 
matter, as he also suggests (Opp, xx). 
The idea advocated by Hedström & Ylikoski (2010) is that a mechanism-based account of scientific 
knowledge is embedded in mechanism schemes and not in empirical generalizations, as with more 
traditional empiricist accounts. The suggestion is that middle-range theories are about these 
mechanism schemes. These mechanism schemes are more or less general in the sense that they  can 
be employed and adapted to particular situations and explanatory tasks. So although empirical data, 
research methods, and substantial theories differ from one subfield of sociology to another, the 
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general ideas about possible causal mechanisms are something these fields could share, and thereby 
benefit from each other’s work. If these points are taken into account, it clear that most of the points 
Opp makes against middle-range theories are based on misunderstanding. 
I believe that  the idea of mechanism-based integration is important in a highly  specialized and 
fragmented discipline such as sociology. It helps to build bridges between the different subfields of 
sociology, but also with other social sciences. This view also provides a fruitful way to think about 
the growth of social scientific knowledge: knowledge accumulates as the understanding of 
individual mechanisms grows and new mechanisms are found (Ylikoski 2011). This vision of 
knowledge does not require that all social scientific mechanisms be ultimately  organized into a 
grand unified deductive theory. It is only assumed that the elements of the mechanical toolbox are 
mutually  compatible and combinable with each other.  Formal unification is valued, but only  if it 
brings along a substantial integration of how we understand the ways in which the world works. It 
is my impression that pursuing the rational choice theory foundations for sociology does not 
provide such substantial integration. It  cannot  therefore be presented as a real alternative to the 
vision of middle-range theorizing. 
Conclusion
Opp in his paper advocates a comparative approach to the evaluation of methodologies and theories. 
I fully  agree. However, it is important for this approach that the bookkeeping is taken seriously. It is 
crucial to keep  track of the problems of one’s own approach and of the merits of the competing 
approaches. In my judgement, Opp’s paper fails on both counts: he does not take seriously the 
arguments that have accumulated against the HO theory, and he fails to acknowledge many of the 
advantages of the mechanisms-based approach. For example, it helps to rethink the position of 
rational choice theory  in sociology  without losing its real accomplishments. Of course, the 
mechanisms-based approach to social sciences is far from ready. It  requires further conceptual 
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clarification and, most importantly, good exemplars of mechanisms-based theorizing. However, I 
am confident that the HO theory does not have much to contribute to either.
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